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Abstract: Aristotle’s contribution to the metaphysics of numbers is often described in terms of a critical response to the Platonist paradigm. Plato, we are told, conceives of numbers as abstract entities entirely distinct from the physical objects around us, while Aristotle takes the more mundane view that numbers are pluralities of physical objects considered in a particular way, a way relevant to mathematics. Without rejecting altogether this familiar picture, this paper aims to show that Aristotle has another major contribution to offer to the history of philosophy of mathematics. In the Metaphysics, he claims that numbers too can be analysed in terms of matter and form (hylomorphism). On the hylomorphic model, a number has both a material component (the units in the number) and a formal one (the structure that keeps the units together). The paper fully explores the motivations behind Aristotle’s hylomorphic conception of numbers, as well as its most significant implications.





Is there an Aristotelian paradigm in the philosophy of arithmetic? Answers to this question are normally phrased in terms of discontinuity with Platonist ideas about the existence and nature of mathematical objects in general. Plato, we are told, conceives of mathematical objects as entities entirely distinct from the physical objects around us, i.e. as abstract entities inhabiting a world accessible through intellectual knowledge only and inaccessible to the senses. Aristotle, by contrast, takes a more mundane view by claiming that mathematics talks about the physical objects around us considered in a particular way, a way relevant to mathematics. Whether or not mathematical objects are for Aristotle quite the physical objects around us will depend on the force one attaches to the idea that physical objects are considered in a particular way by mathematicians. While one may well think that emphasis should be put on the claim that mathematical objects are just physical objects, though considered in a particular way, the option is open to interpreters to say that the way in which mathematicians consider physical objects affects the nature of those objects and so mathematical objects end up being a peculiar kind of objects, dependent on but distinct from ordinary physical objects.​[1]​ Be that as it may, Aristotle’s major contribution to the history of the ontology of mathematical objects would be on this picture to bring such objects back from the Platonic heaven to the earth of the ordinary physical world. And what applies to mathematical objects in general applies to number in particular. Numbers are for Aristotle just pluralities of physical objects considered in a particular way, a way relevant to mathematics.
It is not my intention to deny the truth of this traditional story, or to downplay the importance of Platonism in the development of Aristotle’s views on the nature of numbers. In this paper, I wish to explore a different line of thought, which has so far been neglected by Aristotelian scholars and historians of mathematics alike. This is simply the idea that Aristotle’s thoughts about the nature of numbers do not only stem from his critical attitude towards Platonism, but can only be seen as a development from his most peculiar and controversial metaphysical claims. More particularly, I shall argue that, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle is prepared to apply one of his most characteristic metaphysical distinctions, i.e. the distinction between matter and form (hylomorphism), to the case of numbers. The application of hylomorphism to the case of numbers has significant consequences for Aristotle’s conception of arithmetic, the most important of which is that numbers are viewed as structured wholes, having both a material and a formal component. On this view, the familiar idea that numbers are, for Aristotle, pluralities of physical objects considered in a certain way is only the beginning and not the end of story. For on the hylomorphic model, numbers are pluralities of countable physical objects arranged in a certain numerical structure. More generally, if I am right, Aristotle’s original contribution to the philosophy of arithmetic does not simply consist in a response to Platonism, but also in a sophisticated metaphysical treatment of the nature of numbers. In the rest of this introduction, I wish to sketch out the nature of the problems that will be dealt with in this paper and indicate the general line of my argument.
The central text for my reconstruction is Met. H 3. In this chapter, Aristotle comes up with the rather surprising claim that, if substances are in some sense numbers, they are so not by being numbers of units, as some people (the Platonists) tend to describe numbers. Aristotle’s wording makes it clear that the antecedent of this claim should be taken to be true and hence substances are indeed like numbers— provided, of course, that the nature of numbers is properly understood. Although the substance-number analogy which Aristotle develops in H 3 contains several points, the core claim is that both substances and numbers are not aggregates, but real unities. Just as substances, in other words, are not aggregates of their parts, so numbers are not aggregates of their parts, i.e. of units. Thus, substances are something over and above their parts. Likewise, numbers are something over and above the plurality of units that constitute them.
	In spite of its interest, the substance-number analogy has not received much attention from contemporary scholars.​[2]​ Not so in medieval and early modern times, when the analogy was quite popular and got condensed in the slogan ‘substantiae sunt sicut numeri’. Curiously enough, medieval and modern philosophers seem to have taken up only one side of Aristotle’s analogy and gone, as it were, from numbers to substances. Their interest lay in how the analogy might contribute to our understanding of substances: what structural properties of numbers can be carried over to substances? In this paper, I wish to take the substance-number analogy very seriously, and make it the starting point for a reconstruction of Aristotle’s mature thoughts about the nature of number. Consequently, I also wish to take a course different from medieval and modern philosophers, and go in the other direction, from substances to numbers: what can the analogy tell us about Aristotle’s conception of numbers? More particularly, these are the two questions I shall try to answer: 

(Q1) What does it mean that numbers are not aggregates of units?  
(Q2) What philosophical motivations does Aristotle have to make his claim (i.e. what aspects of the nature of numbers are not captured by describing them as aggregates of units)?

My response to (Q1) will be that Aristotle tries to apply to numbers the matter-form analysis that has proved to be so useful in understanding the metaphysical structure of material substances. On this analysis, a certain number will be analysable into a material aspect (the several units that compose it) and a formal aspect (some sort of structure, arrangement or grouping of such units). Thus, numbers are not aggregates, but rather structured wholes by analogy with ordinary material objects.  
Answering (Q2) is more complicated. But the gist of it is that Aristotle primarily conceives of numbers as groups of things. The group language invites us to raise problems concerning the unity and identity of numbers: what makes a group of six units one group and not six unrelated things? What makes a group of six things a group of six things and not a group of seven? Aristotle’s view is that a certain plurality of units makes up a number only if the units in the plurality somehow hold together and are a unity distinguishable from other groups of things. This, in turn, is possible only if numbers do possess a formal aspect that keeps together the units in the different numbers and so accounts for the numbers’ unity and identity. 
My discussion will fall into four parts. In Section II, I shall present a sketchy reconstruction of the text (Met. H 3, 1043b32-1044a9) in which Aristotle presents the substance-number analysis. In Section III, I shall move on to Aristotle’s evaluation of the standard intuition that numbers are composed of units. What I intend to show here is that there are several aspects of this intuition that Aristotle is inclined to agree with, but also others that he regards as potentially misleading. In particular, Aristotle does not want us to construe the claim that numbers are composed of units as equivalent to the different one that numbers are aggregates of units. Questions Q1 and Q2 above will be taken up explicitly and discussed at length in Section IV. Finally, I shall raise and solve a difficulty for my interpretation of the text in Met. H 3. My reading presupposes that there is indeed a strong symmetry between the structure of material objects and the structure of numbers. In Met. H 3, however, Aristotle illustrates the substance-number analogy with reference to the definition of substances and not to material substances themselves. In Section V, therefore, I shall try to show why this is no obstacle to my contention that Aristotle applies to numbers the hylomorphic analysis. 

II The Substance-number Analogy in Met. H 3

Let me start off with an outline of Aristotle’s argument in Met. H 3, 1043b32-1044a9:

(A) First, Aristotle makes the general claim that, if it is true that substances are in some sense numbers, this is not true on any understanding of numbers. In particular, it is not true if numbers are thought of as “numbers of units”, i.e. presumably as aggregates or sums of units ( 3, 1043b32-34).
(B) Then, Aristotle brings out four points of analogy between substances and numbers:
(1)	A definition is some sort of number because, exactly like numbers, it is divisible into indivisibles (1043b34-36).
(2)	If we add something to or take away something from a certain number (no matter how small the addition or the subtraction is), then the number will no longer be the same. Likewise, if we add something to or take away something from a definition and an essence, the definition and the essence in question will no longer be the same (1044a36-1044a2).
(3)	In the case of both numbers and definitions, it is necessary that there be something in virtue of which they are unities. For, either numbers and definitions are mere aggregates (which is not the case), or they are unities, in which case we must give an account of why they are so. But people usually cannot provide such an account either for numbers or for definitions. This happens naturally enough, because a substance has the kind of unity that a number, not a unit, has, i.e. it is an actuality and a definite nature (1044a2-9).
(4)	Just as number does not take the more and the less, neither does substance taken according to form. It is only substance taken together with matter that takes the more and the less (1044a9-11).

In (A), Aristotle makes a general claim about the relationship between substances and numbers: substances are like numbers, provided that we do not construe numbers as numbers of units, i.e. aggregates of units. Then, in (B), he introduces four specific points of analogy which are supposed to confirm the general claim made in (A). One first thing to note is that, although the analogy is introduced as one between numbers and substances, it is then spelt out in (B) with reference to definitions. This is problematic, and I shall try to say something more about it in Section V. Suffice it to observe, for now, that the context makes it clear that it is the definition of substances that Aristotle has in mind. Whether or not there is some resemblance between numbers and definitions in general, it is clearly with reference to the definition of substances that the resemblance mostly shows. One reason Aristotle may have had to press this point is that it is only substances that are definable or, at least, it is only they that are definable in the strict sense of the term, as emerges from the discussion in Met. Z 4-5.​[3]​ Things other than substances are definable only in a secondary sense—if they are definable at all. Thus, it is natural for Aristotle to assume that he is entitled to use the example of definitions to make a point about substances in general.
	It takes just a quick look at Aristotle’s text to see that the four points of analogy (B1-B4) between substances and numbers are far from being unproblematic. One difficulty is that B1-B4 are supposed to provide some support for Aristotle’s thoughts about the nature of numbers, i.e. that they are not aggregates of units. But it seems that only B3 actually does so. In B3, Aristotle remarks that neither definitions nor numbers are aggregates, but real unities. If this is so, however, it is natural to conclude that there must be something in virtue of which they both are unities. This suggests that both definitions and numbers must possess, in addition to the parts that get somehow unified, a principle in virtue of which the parts are unified. It is not clear, by contrast, how B1, B2, and B4 should help us to go beyond the idea that numbers are aggregates of units. What is worse, B1 and B2 seem to stand even if one does construe numbers as mere aggregates of units. B1, for instance, says that a definition is a sort of number because, just like numbers, a definition is divisible into indivisibles. I take it that Aristotle’s point here is that a definition must be analysed into undefinables, i.e. terms that we have to take as primitive and not susceptible of definition. Admittedly, many of the definitions Aristotle standardly presents us with seem to contain terms that are further definable: in the definition ‘a man is a two-footed animal’, for instance, ‘animal’ is certainly susceptible of further definition. But Aristotle’s point must be that a definition must ultimately be analysable into undefinables, and so we must stop defining at some point or other. The process of definition cannot go on indefinitely on pain of not grasping the nature of the object defined. Were the process to be carried on indefinitely, we would never reach the point at which we could say we know the object we are trying to define. 
Now, Aristotle’s remark on definitions carries over perfectly well to numbers even if numbers are aggregates of units. Just like definitions, numbers too are divisible into indivisibles, that is, the units of which a number is composed. Suppose now that numbers are just aggregates of units. Thus any collection of six units, regardless of whether they are grouped together or unified in some particular way, is an instance of number 6. There seems to be no reason why number 6 so conceived should not be thought of as divisible into indivisibles, i.e. the units of which it is composed. Thus, it is not clear how the divisibility issue contributes to promoting the conception of numbers which Aristotle advocates.
	Something similar can be said about B2. B2 claims that definitions and numbers are alike because, if we add something to or take away something from a definition or a number, the definition or the number will no longer be the same. The point is straightforward. If one adds a term to or takes away a term from a definition, one will end up defining not the object one intended to define, but something else. Analogously, if we add to a number or we take away from it even one unit, the number will no longer be the same. In this case as well, however, the analogy goes through even if numbers are just aggregates of units. For B2 only requires that numbers be composed of units, and hence it is not clear how thinking of them as structured wholes, i.e. as things endowed with some form or structure, could make the analogy with definitions any tighter. 
	B4 is problematic in another respect. In B4, Aristotle says that neither numbers nor substances take the more and the less. He hastens to add, however, that the analogy holds only for substance taken according to form, and not for substance taken together with matter. Since the discussion so far has been concerned with definitions, it is surprising that Aristotle should switch here to talk of matter and form. I shall postpone my answer to this difficulty to Section V. There is, however, a more immediate concern. Does Aristotle want us to take the point of analogy generically or specifically?​[4]​ In other words: is he saying that any number is not more of a number than any other? Or is he rather trying to make the point that any instance of number 6 is not more 6 than any other? I am inclined to take the analogy specifically, for the following reason: in Phys. IV, 12, in the course of his discussion of time, Aristotle remarks that the number of a hundred horses and that of a hundred men is the same if we consider the number by which we count, and not the same if we consider the number which is counted.​[5]​ In other words, the two numbers are the same number because the number of objects in a collection of a hundred horses is the same as the number of objects in a collection of a hundred men. The two numbers differ, by contrast, because they are numbers of different things, the first being the number of horses, the second the number of men. It is natural to think that, when Aristotle says in B4 that substances and numbers do not take the more and the less, he is thinking of the sense in which the number of two equinumerous collections is the same. Thus, a collection of six objects is not more an instance of the number 6 than any other. Be that as it may, it is not evident how considerations about the more and the less should cast some light on Aristotle’s general idea that numbers are structured wholes and not aggregates of units.
	What are we to make of the argument in H 3? The substance-number analogy might seem rather disappointing. Three of the four points of analogy may not make any contribution toward supporting the claim that numbers are not aggregates of units. Moreover, B1 and B2 may be taken to show that there is nothing more to the nature of numbers than their being aggregates of units, after all. I suggest we wait before jumping to conclusions. For one thing, it is clear that Aristotle has a dossier on the analogy between substances and numbers. The most important claim in the dossier is that there is something more to the nature of numbers than their being composed of units. But this does not imply that other points of analogy cannot hold true on a weaker and less demanding conception of the nature of numbers. Second, and most importantly, Aristotle rejects the view that numbers are aggregates of units. He does not object to the intuitive idea that numbers have units as their parts. Thus, it is natural to expect that many of the characteristic properties of numbers do, in fact, depend on their being made of units. In the next section, I shall clarify what Aristotle believes is right and what wrong in the intuitive association between numbers and collections of units.

III Aristotle on numbers, units and unities

Aristotle’s official definition of a number is that it is “a plurality of indivisibles”,​[6]​ i.e. “a plurality of units”.​[7]​ Moreover, Aristotle seems to identify the unit with the number 1 and believes, together with the mathematicians of his time, that the unit/1 is not a number, but rather the principle of numbers.​[8]​ 1, in other words, is the principle that generates the number series by being added on over and over again. Thus, a number always involves a plurality of units.
	There are many aspects of the conception of numbers as pluralities of units that Aristotle is willing to accept. In Met. M 6-9, in the course of his violent polemic against Plato’s conception of Ideal Numbers or Form Numbers, Aristotle often makes reference to “the mathematical number”.​[9]​ His aim is to point out that Ideal Numbers, whether they exist or not, cannot possibly be the numbers mathematicians talk about. Thus, for Aristotle, any philosophical account of the nature and structure of numbers should do justice to actual mathematical practice.​[10]​ Such a practice centres upon the nature of units and the role they play in numbers. There are at least four features of mathematical numbers that emerge from Aristotle’s discussion in Met., M 6-9:

F1) Numbers are counted by adding units so that after 1 we get  2, after  2 we get  3, and so on (M 6, 1080a30-33). 
F2) There are limitless numbers of the same kind, i.e. there are limitlessly many 2’s, 3’s, and so on (M 7, 1081a10-11).
F3) A number is composed of undifferentiated units, i.e. of units that are perfectly alike both quantitatively and qualitatively (M 6, 1080a20-21; M 7, 1081a19-21).
F4) The units in a number are ‘associable’ or ‘comparable’ (συμβληταί) with both the units in the same number and those in any other number, i.e. they enter into arithmetic operations (addition, subtraction etc.) with any other units (M 6, 1080a20-21; M 7, 1081a5-7). 

Aristotle seems to think that F1)-F4) represent the way mathematicians normally think of numbers. F1) captures the idea that the number series is generated by adding one unit after another. Aristotle observes that this implies that, for instance, number 4 contains number 3, on the grounds that number 4 is generated by adding one unit to  number 3.​[11]​ F2) guarantees that, in normal mathematical practice, we may also work with equinumerous groups of units: ‘2+3=5’ and ‘3+3=6’ are equally legitimate arithmetic operations. But ‘3+3=6’, Aristotle believes, presupposes that there are two groups of three units, two 3’s, which we may add to one another. 
F3) and F4) are closely connected. F4) establishes that the units in a number can enter into arithmetic operations both with one another and with the units in another number. Take a group of four units, for instance. I can take away two units from that group and so obtain two units. But I can also add to the group of four units a group of three units, thereby obtaining a group of seven units, i.e. a 7. Aristotle seems to think that F4) is true only if F3) is true as well, i.e. only if the units in all numbers are all alike, where ‘all alike’ means quantitatively and qualitatively undifferentiated. Part of the idea behind F3) must be that only things of the same kind can be counted together—a principle which Aristotle subscribes to.​[12]​ To take an example from concrete pluralities, while it is perfectly normal to add three apples to four apples, because the things that we add belong to the same kind, there would not be much point in adding three apples to four cats, because apples and cats belong to different kinds. Of course, apples and cats can be counted together if we come by a higher kind under which both fall, e.g. substance, in which case we count seven substances. On the basis of Aristotle’s principle of homogeneity, if mathematical units were different in kind, we could not perform any kind of operation with and on them. 
At the beginning of Met., M 8, Aristotle provides us with a sustained argument in favour of F3). He argues that units cannot be different from one another either quantitatively or qualitatively.​[13]​ That one unit does not differ from another in quantity seems to be obvious. But the point is made even more evident by the thought that, if units differed in quantity, two numbers composed of the same number of units would differ in quantity, one being greater than the other – which is paradoxical, because the common intuition is precisely that sameness in the number of units is just sameness in number.​[14]​ Neither can units differ in quality either, considering what Aristotle means by ‘quality’ in this instance.​[15]​ A quality of a number is a standard mathematical property such as being prime, being square and so on. Thus, Aristotle’s reasonable point is that, while the numbers resulting from the units may differ in quality, the units in the numbers do not. Number 3 and number 4 differ in quality (4 is a square number, while 3 is not), and so do 2 and 6 (2 is a prime number, while 6 is not), but the units in all such numbers have no properties that might mark them off from one another.
The conclusion of my brief survey of what Aristotle has to say about mathematical numbers in Met. M 6-9 is that there are many features of numbers as they are conceived by mathematicians that should be preserved in a philosophical analysis of the nature of numbers. What is more, many of these features seem to be linked with the intuitive idea that numbers are composed of undifferentiated units, which may enter into arithmetic operations. So, why does Aristotle think that the traditional conception of numbers as pluralities of units is, as it stands, insufficient? The answer should be that, as our passage from H 3 shows, this conception could easily mislead one into thinking that numbers are just aggregates of units and nothing else. Fine, but why should we not think that numbers are aggregates of units after all, given that this view seems to sit rather comfortably with mathematical practice?
In various places in the Metaphysics, Aristotle complains that Platonists cannot give an account of the unity of numbers. In Met. A 9, for instance, he asks Plato the following question: “Why is number taken as a whole one” (i.e. a unity)?​[16]​ A similar complaint is voiced in  10 (1075b34-36): “No one says a word about why number is one, or the body is one, or in general the form and the thing”. Thus, it is clear that the conception of numbers as aggregates of units cannot, in Aristotle’s eyes, explain why a certain number is a unity, that is, why the units in a certain number hold together and so are one thing, one number. Aristotle’s assumption here seems clearly to be that not any collections of units make up a number, but only those collections in which the units are somehow unified and hold together. Aristotle’s concern with the issue of the unity of numbers is by no means episodic and is often coupled with a similar concern with the identity of numbers: what makes a particular number that number and not another? What makes six units an instance of number 6 as opposed to two instances of number 3? This emerges if we consider a text from Met.,  14, the chapter on quality (τὸ ποιόν). In this text, Aristotle remarks that there is a sense of ‘quality’ that also concerns the objects of mathematics. We have already come across the idea that numbers have qualities, i.e. such mathematical properties as being prime or square. But I think it is a slightly different sense of ‘quality’ that Aristotle has in mind in  14, i.e. ‘quality’ in the sense of the essential differentia of an object. And numbers do have a quality in the sense of an essential differentia. The essential differentia of each number is what belongs to the essence of that number in addition to its quantitative aspect.​[17]​ Aristotle exemplifies his general point with the case of number 6:  number 6 is not what it is twice or thrice, but what it is once. For number 6 is once 6.  Number 6 as 6, in other words, is not twice 3 or thrice 2, but once 6. Aristotle’s general point in the passage seems to be the following. When we sum three groups of two units, by saying for instance ‘2+2+2=6’, we are presupposing that each group of two units is a distinct group of two objects somehow possessing some form of unity or togetherness. When we talk about number 6 as a group of six units, by contrast, we are presupposing that it is the six units of number 6 that somehow hold together to form a unity, with the result that it is incorrect to identify number 6 as twice 3 or thrice 2. For that would somehow break the unity of the number. 
The passage from Met.,  14 also hints at Aristotle’s solution to the difficulty. If numbers have a unity and an identity then it is natural to suppose that there must be something that accounts for their unity and identity. Aristotle’s proposal, therefore, is that each number has both a quantitative or material component, i.e. the units that compose it, and a qualitative or formal aspect, which is supposed to explain the unity and identity of the number in question. In conclusion, Aristotle seems to be prepared to apply to numbers some version of the hylomorphic model that has proved so useful in accounting for the structure of material objects. In the following section, I shall try to explain what the application consists in and what motivations Aristotle has for proceeding this way.

IV Aristotle on the structure of numbers

On introducing the general topic of this paper, I threw on the table two questions about the meaning of the substance-number analogy:

(Q1) What does it mean that numbers are not aggregates of units?  
(Q2) What philosophical motivations does Aristotle have to make his claim?

The discussion in Section 2 has provided us with a solution to Q1. Aristotle wishes to apply the hylomorphic model he has employed in the metaphysical analysis of sensible substances to numbers. On this conception, numbers are structured wholes, which can be analysed into a material aspect (the units composing them) and a formal one (the structure or form that keeps the units together). This discussion has also given us some hints on how Q2 might be answered. Aristotle is worried about problems concerning the unity and identity of numbers: what makes a group of six units one thing? What makes a group of six units that group (i.e. a group of six units and so an instance of number 6) and not another? 
	Aristotle’s general intuitions about numbers and their structure raise several difficulties. Take Q1 and the application of the hylomorphic model to numbers. One thing we would like to know is whether the form or structure that keeps together a certain number of units is generic or specific. In other words, is a group of six units kept together by the same unifying principle as a group of seven units, i.e. some sort of generic togetherness? Or is the unifying principle different for different numbers, so that a group of six units is kept together by some sort of 6-structure and a group of seven units by some sort of 7-structure? There are also problems with the answer to Q2. Why is Aristotle led to think that we need a unifying principle for numbers in the first place? What general conception of numbers underlies his inclination to describe numbers as structured wholes?
	Let me take up the more general issue first, the conception of numbers underlying Q2 and my solution to it. Much ink has been spilled over Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics.​[18]​ Discussions have mainly revolved around Aristotle’s rejection of a Platonist metaphysics of numbers, as well as the extent to which his view can be characterized as ‘abstractionist’. I do not wish to go into such debates here. I shall rather confine myself to recalling a few points that may be of some help in solving the problems raised by the substance-number analogy. We may start by observing that for Aristotle numerical predicates apply to and are true of sensible objects.​[19]​ We truly say that there are three cows in the stable and four people in the room. Sensible objects, therefore, like cows and people, have numerical properties: they do come in groups of two, three, four etc. Of course, arithmetic is not interested in all the features of sensible objects. It is not concerned, for instance, with what they essentially are or with how they come into being and pass away. Arithmetic studies sensible objects only insofar as they have arithmetical properties. The relevant arithmetical property here is countability. Thus, sensible objects are studied by arithmetic only qua (i.e. insofar as they are) countable. 
Aristotle provides us with a fairly clear description of how we count sensible things. Counting presupposes that we fix a unit by which we count and then proceed to ascertain how many units there are in the group we wish to count. The unit will normally be an instance of a certain kind. If we want to count human beings, we pick one human being as the relevant unit. Thus, the number of human beings in a certain group will be the number of human being-units in the group. This procedure is legitimate, Aristotle thinks, because, even though a human being is divisible into many parts, a human being qua human is indivisible.​[20]​ If we divide a human being into parts, none of the parts is a human being and, hence, a human being is, in this sense, indivisible. Thus, human beings, cows etc. can be treated as indivisibles, i.e. as units. Aristotle’s application of the qua-logic (arithmetic studies sensible objects qua countable, a human being qua human being is indivisible) explains how he can give an account of the actual practice in mathematics. Although arithmetic is about sensible objects, arithmeticians clearly do not talk about human beings, cows etc., but about numbers and units. But this is understandable enough, because human beings and cows are, from the point of view of their arithmetical properties, just groups of units. Mathematicians, therefore, can harmlessly enough disregard what kind of things the units they reason about are. For nothing of what they have to say about units depends on the nature of the objects they consider as indivisible in the first place. The foregoing account provides us with a clear picture of the nature of mathematical numbers. In the concrete, numbers are just groups or pluralities of sensible objects qua countable, groups in which each object is taken as a unit. Numbers, of course, can also be considered in the abstract, as when we say that the number of cows in the stable is the same as the number of people in the room.​[21]​ In this case, there is a number that we associate with both the group of cows and the group of human beings. But Aristotle seems to suggest that numbers in the abstract are derivative with respect to concrete numbers.​[22]​ He observes, for instance, that ‘3’ used as a name is derivative from ‘three’ used as an adjective. Thus, the expression ‘the number of cows in the stable is 3’ is derivative from ‘there are three cows in the stable’. All this suggests that it is the concrete way of speaking that best captures the nature of numbers. Numbers are groups of sensible things qua countable, i.e. groups of units.
	Now, it is the notion of group that is particularly relevant to the problems that concern us here. For, if we push the group language a little farther, we shall see why Aristotle may have been led to think that numbers are unities and so need a principle in virtue of which they are unities. Suppose that there is a group of six people in the dining room. Aristotle’s point seems to be that, when we consider the six people as a group of six people, we are taking the six people as a unity. In doing so, we are treating the group as one group, distinct from other groups of objects. If there are six more people in another room, they constitute a different group of six objects and so a different unity. But in order for the six people to be distinct from other groups of things, they must somehow hang together and so there must be something that keeps them together. In my example, I made things easy by supposing that the two different groups of people are in different rooms. The spatial dispersal of the two groups renders it intuitively more plausible that the units in each group are somehow together. However, Aristotle’s idea should be regarded as a generalized version of my example. If a group of n things is a distinct group of n things, the n things must be grouped together, and so a principle is required that groups them together. 
 Even more clarity on Aristotle’s idea can be gained if we consider that, when we are treating the six people in the dining room as a group of six people, we are thereby excluding other possible groupings within the six people. The group of six people is certainly divisible into two groups of three people, just as it is divisible into six person-units. But when we consider the six people as a group of six things, we are excluding that there actually are two groups of three people or six person-units there. Were we to split the group into two groups of three people, we would immediately destroy the unity of the original group and create two distinct and new unities, i.e. two groups of three people. Another way of making this point is to say that both the two groups of three people and the six person-units exist potentially and not actually in the group of six people. There is some analogy here with the case of the division of the line. In the latter case as well, the parts of the line, i.e. the segments, exist in the line only potentially and not actually. Were we actually to divide a line, we would immediately break its continuity and so create a plurality of distinct segments.​[23]​ The analogy is all the more telling if we bear in mind that in Met. Z 13 Aristotle uses the example of the line to explain his claim that a substance cannot be composed of substances existing in actuality.​[24]​ The actuality of the parts of a substance is incompatible with its unity, just as the actual division of a line is incompatible with its unity, i.e. with its being continuous. That Aristotle’s pattern of reasoning also applies to substances is a further indication that it may be easily carried over to numbers, if indeed substances are in a way like numbers. Two groups of three people, as well as six person-units, exist only potentially in a group of six people.
We can see that the potentiality-actuality model is relevant to understanding Aristotle’s thoughts about the structure of numbers if we turn once again to the polemic against Platonism. In Met. M 8, 1084b2 ff., Aristotle takes issue with the Platonist understanding of the nature of the one.​[25]​ He protests that Platonists want to have it both ways, by making the one both a material and a formal principle of number. For Platonists maintain both that a number is composed of units, and so the one taken as a unit is a material principle of the different numbers, and that each number is a unity, and so the one is a formal principle that is predicated of each number. For each number is one number, distinct from all the others. Certainly, part of Aristotle’s intent is to charge Platonists with equivocation and inconsistency. When they say that the one is the principle of number(s) and so as a principle is prior to number(s), they do not specify whether it is the material or the formal principle that they are talking about. The result is attributing incompatible properties to the one. For being a material principle is not the same thing as being a formal principle. Neither is the formal principle prior according to the same sense of ‘prior’ as the material principle. The material principle is prior in generation or time, while the formal principle is prior in definition and substance.​[26]​ The one taken as material principle is prior in generation, because numbers are somehow generated by adding units. More difficult to understand is what Aristotle means by saying that as a formal principle the one is prior in definition and substance (to the units). But one reasonable suggestion is that, formally speaking, a certain number is one thing of a certain kind (for instance a 6 or a 7), and so it is its particular nature, its being a 6 or a 7, that determines how many units it is composed of.​[27]​  Thus, the number taken as one thing is prior to the units of which it is composed because it is the nature of a particular number that determines how many units it contains and not the other way round. In any event, the text shows that more than equivocation and inconsistency is at stake here. What Platonists did not see is that, once we realize that numbers have a formal unity, we should reconsider the sense in which units are material parts of a number. Once we realize, in other words, that a certain number is one thing, we should also see that the units in the number exist only potentially and not actually.​[28]​ 
Aristotle’s remarks square with my reconstruction of the philosophical motivations behind the claim that numbers are unities. More importantly, in the M 8 passage, Aristotle is clearly assimilating numbers to hylomorphic composites, which are analysable into a material aspect (the units that compose them) and a formal one (the principle that keeps the material parts together and so ensures the unity and identity of the number).​[29]​ On this perspective, it is not surprising that he should apply considerations about the structure of hylomorphic composites to numbers. The parts of a hylomorphic composite cannot exist in it in actuality on pain of destroying the unity of the composite. The material parts of a hylomorphic composite exist only potentially. And so do, by analogy, the units of a number as well. 
Against this background, we should now be in a position to answer the question as to whether the formal principle that keeps together the different units of a number is specific or generic. To say that the unifying principle is generic means that what makes six units an instance of number 6 and what makes seven units an instance of number 7 is one and the same principle. Presumably, in that case the unifying principle would be some sort of togetherness: a certain plurality of units is a number (no matter what number) when they are somehow together. There are indications, however, that Aristotle wants us to construe the unifying principle as specific to each number. We have seen that in Met. Δ 14 Aristotle observes that each number is characterized by some sort of essential differentia. This thought crops up again in Met. M 8, where it is suggested that units do not have a differentia, i.e. are qualitatively undifferentiated, while the numbers resulting from units do have one.​[30]​ Aristotle’s reference to the differentia chimes very well with the idea that the unifying principle of a number is specific, for a differentia is normally taken to be characteristic of a certain species or kind. Thus, the principle that keeps together a group of six things is specific to number 6 and hence is different from the principle that keeps together a group of seven things, which is specific to number 7. But what could that possibly mean? My answer is the following. Take a group of six units. On Aristotle’s view, the six units are an instance of number 6. Now ask the question: are the six units an instance of number 6 because there are six units out there? Or, is it rather the case that there are six units out there because there is an instance of number 6? Aristotle’s argument against Platonism teaches us that there are two possible responses to this question, depending on whether it is material or formal explanation that we are after. Materially speaking, the group of six units is there because there are six units. After all, numbers are somehow constructed out of units, as Aristotle is ready to concede. Things are different, however, if it is formal explanation that we are after. Formally speaking, there being six units out there depends on there being an instance of number 6, and not the other way round. For it is built into the nature of number 6 that it is composed of six units, and not of five or seven. This explains in what sense the formal principle that keeps together six units and makes them an instance of number 6 is different from the principle that keeps together seven units and makes them an instance of number 7. For, at the level of formal explanation, it is the nature of a certain number that determines how many units an instance of the number will be composed of, and not the other way round, and hence it is perfectly natural to expect the nature of number 6 to be different from the nature of number 7 with respect to the number of units they respectively contain. 
This suggestion may explain some aspects of Aristotle’s discussion of numbers that might seem otherwise problematic. According to Aristotle’s discussion in H 3, one point of analogy between definition and number (B 2 from Section 1) is that definition and number are alike, because any addition to or subtraction from either of them will change their nature and identity. As I remarked in Section 1, the problem with this point of analogy is that it seems to make no contribution to Aristotle’s claim that numbers are not aggregates of units. What is worse, the analogy holds good even if numbers are indeed aggregates of units, or so it might seem. But we can now see that B2 does make a contribution, after all, to the idea that numbers are not aggregates of units. For, if my suggestion is right, the reason why any addition to or any subtraction from a certain number will change the identity of the number is not only or not primarily that a unit is added to or taken away from the number. This is just the material explanation of what is going on. Formally speaking, it is the nature of a certain number that determines how many units it must be made of. And so it is the nature of a certain number that forbids any addition to or subtraction from the number of units. 
Finally, my suggestion may also explain Aristotle’s obscure remark in Met. Δ 14 that number 6 is essentially what it is once and not what it is twice or thrice. It is built into the nature of number 6 not only that it be composed of six units, but also that it be composed of six units taken, as it were, all together. Thus, even though it is true that two units taken three times (or three units taken twice) make six units, it is not as the sum of groups of two units or as the sum of groups of three units that  number 6 should be identified, but as six units taken together. This thought squares with the previously explored idea that dividing a number breaks its unity and creates a plurality of different numbers. It also gives further intuitive content to the claim that both the sub-groups and the units in a number exist only potentially. Any actual division of a certain number is incompatible with the nature of the number, i.e. with its being that number and not another.   

V Numbers and substances

Most of what I said so far presupposes that the substance-number analogy centres on a comparison between numbers and material substances, i.e. composites of matter and form. The units in a certain number play a role analogous to that played by matter, while the principle of unity or differentia of the number is analogous to form. The trouble with this reading is that the substance-number analogy is spelt out in H 3 with reference to definitions and not (at least directly) to hylomorphic composites. The first three of the four points of analogy Aristotle draws our attention to (B1-B3 in Section 1) make reference to the definitions of substances and not to hylomorphic composites. One might hope to get some help from the fourth point of comparison (B4), i.e. the claim that neither substances nor numbers take the more and the less. For Aristotle hastens to add that this claim is true only of substance taken as form and not of substance taken together with matter. Thus, one might reason, matter and form are relevant to the substance-number analogy after all. It is not difficult to see, however, that the claim that substances and numbers do not take the more and the less has nothing to do with the issue of the unity of a hylomorphic composite. On the interpretation I favour, the claim should be taken specifically and not generically. Just as one instance of number 6 is not more an instance of 6 than another, thus one human being is not more a human being than another. Aristotle’s further remark that this is true only if a human being is taken according to form and not together with matter could and probably should be taken to imply that there is a sense in which the form of two human beings is common.​[31]​ There is no difference between one human being and another insofar as their form is concerned. Differences, including quantitative differences such as the more and the less, enter the picture only when matter is taken into account, i.e. only when it is individual human beings that we are considering. One human being, for instance, can be bigger than another on account of his or her matter. If this is the meaning of Aristotle’s observation about the more and the less, hylomorphic composites seem to be marginal to the discussion of the substance-number analogy and the issue of their unity never at stake. Thus, one might easily get the impression that the reading I was offering of the parallelism between substance and number is entirely off track.
	One easy way out of this difficulty could be to insist that to talk about the definitions of substances simply is to talk about hylomorphic composites. For one thing, in Book H of the Metaphysics, Aristotle seems to be inclined to maintain that the definition of a material substance must mention both the kind of form and the kind of matter of which the material substance is made.​[32]​ Moreover, in H 6, Aristotle suggests that the problem of the unity of a material substance and that of the unity of definition are solved by making the same move, that is, by having recourse to the potentiality-actuality machinery.​[33]​ Just as matter is potentially what form is actually, thus the genus in a definition is potentially what the differentia is actually. And what is potential and what is actual are in a sense one thing.​[34]​ Finally, in Met. Z 12, Aristotle argues for the conclusion that, in a definition composed of a genus and a plurality of differentiae, it is the last differentia that is the form and substance of the thing defined, while the genus and the intermediate differentiae are material or quasi-material parts of a definition.​[35]​ The last differentia, in other words, absorbs in itself and expresses the whole content of a definition. Putting all these pieces together, one could come up with the following reconstruction of the argument in H 3. The unity of a definition is guaranteed by the fact that one component of the definition, the last differentia, plays the role of form and actuality, while all the other components, i.e. the first genus and the intermediate differentiae, play the role of matter and potentiality. Thus, it is perfectly natural for Aristotle to illustrate the substance-number analogy through the example of definitions, because the unity of a definition perfectly mirrors the unity of a composite of matter and form. 
	Unfortunately, this solution is difficult. For Aristotle does not seem to say in H 3 that the principle that keeps together the different parts of a definition is one of those parts, just as he does not say that the principle that keeps together a certain plurality of units is just one of them.​[36]​ On the contrary, Aristotle seems to go by the assumption that the genus and the differentia in a definition are the parts that must be unified. In H 3, 1043b10-12, for instance, we read: 

Nor is man animal plus two-footed, but there must be something beside (παρά) these, if these are matter, something that is not an element nor is composed of elements, but is the substance.

The passage clearly suggests that the principle that unifies the parts of a definition is distinct from both the genus and the differentia, just as the principle that unifies a number is distinct from the units, and the principle that keeps together the different material parts of a sensible substance is distinct from each of them. Now, it has been argued that Aristotle is not speaking in propria persona here.​[37]​ In other words, the claim that both genus and differentia are material parts of the definition would be the unwelcome consequence of a model of explanation of the unity of definition which Aristotle rejects, i.e. the Platonist model, and not Aristotle’s own position. It is only if genus and differentia are two independent entities and Forms, as they are on the Platonist model, that they can appear to be the material parts of a definition, i.e. the parts to be unified. But the general line of argument in Met. H 3 suggests that, whether or not he is really committed to it, Aristotle is exploring in the chapter a line of thought different from that developed in Met. Z 12 and H 6.​[38]​ This line of thought sits more comfortably with the parallelism he wishes to establish between substances and numbers. And it is this line of thought that I want to pursue to show that hylomorphic composites, and not only their definitions, are relevant to the number-substance analogy.
In H 2-3, Aristotle tries to turn the hylomorphic model into a general explanatory scheme, which might explain simultaneously the unity of at least three different kinds of items: (i) material substances, (ii) definitions and (iii) numbers. Aristotle’s move is more carefully described as an extension of the hylomorphic model from the case of material substances to those of definitions and numbers. In the second part of Met. Z 17, Aristotle argues at some length for the claim that the formal principle that keeps together the material parts of a sensible substance cannot be one of those parts, but must be of a different nature.​[39]​ Aristotle calls the material parts of a substance “elements” and so formulates his claim in its most general form by saying that what keeps together the elements of a substance is not itself an element nor is composed of elements. As can be seen, this general formulation perfectly matches the one Aristotle employs in H 3 to explain his point concerning the unity of definition: what keeps together the parts of a definition (in this case the genus and the differentia) is not an element (i.e. one of the material parts) nor is composed of elements. What guarantees the unity of a definition, in other words, is different in nature from the parts that it unifies. Sameness of wording suggests that Aristotle is trying to apply to definitions the same pattern of reasoning he has employed in the case of sensible substances. This also makes it plausible that he is willing to apply the pattern to the unity of numbers as well.
	The general context of Met. H 2-3 seems to bear out my suggestion. These chapters are dominated by the thought that each thing possesses a formal principle that univocally characterizes and defines its nature. Aristotle describes this principle as a “differentia” (διαφορά). Aristotle’s examples in Met. H 2 of things possessing an essential differentia are rather heterogeneous: honey-water, bundles, books, caskets, thresholds, lintels, the day, the night, ice, etc., are all good examples of things that have an essential differentia. The heterogeneity of the examples is justified by the fact that the essential differentia is specific, that is, is different for different kinds of things. Moreover, as Aristotle makes clear, the examples only serve the purpose of providing an analogical basis for the case he is most interested in, the case of material substances.​[40]​ In many, if not all, of the examples, the essential differentia is some sort of accidental property, be it an external relation that keeps together the different parts of an artefact or the characteristic state of a certain kind of body. In the case of material substances, by contrast, the differentia is substantial in nature, i.e. it is the form characteristic of a certain kind of substance. The whole discussion, in other words, is supposed to give further strength to Met. Z’s characteristic view that the form of a material object is the substance of the object, i.e. is that which characterizes and defines its nature.​[41]​ It is no coincidence, for instance, that Aristotle observes that the essential differentia is predicated of matter – which is just a reparsing of Z’s characteristic claim that form is predicated of matter.​[42]​ Thus, the essential differentia Aristotle presents us with in H 2 is nothing but the unifying principle he argues for in Z 17, i.e. what keeps together the different material parts of a substance and hence cannot be any of them.
	The reference to the Z 17 argument becomes even more explicit in H 3. In the first part of the chapter, Aristotle remarks that a syllable is not the letters plus their arrangement, just as a house is not the stones plus their arrangement.​[43]​ The example of the syllable is one of Aristotle’s favourite examples in Z 17. The gist of Aristotle’s remark also comes from Z 17: the principle that keeps together and unifies the parts of a thing cannot be one of those parts and must rather be different in nature from each and all of them. What Aristotle wants to show next is that similar considerations apply to a definition and its parts. Aristotle’s use of the word ‘differentia’ to describe the formal principle of a thing may mislead one into thinking that he has in mind the same line of thought as he explores in Met. Z 12 (and possibly in H 6): what guarantees the unity of a definition is that the last differentia plays the role of substance and form, while the genus and the intermediate differentiae play a material role. But, as I have observed earlier on, this cannot possibly be the case. In the model Aristotle has in mind in H 3, the genus and the differentia are both analogous to the letters of a syllable or to the stones of a house, and none of them is analogous to the characteristic arrangement or combination of either a syllable or a house. Thus, what unifies the different parts of a definition must be distinct from the parts it unifies. But what could possibly keep together the parts of a definition on this conception? Certainly not some sort of external tie or relation, because that would make the resulting unity too weak. In general, things that are kept together by an external tie or relation, be it some binding or gluing or what have you, are not regarded by Aristotle as substances.​[44]​ The reason is that such wholes are not real unities, since the external tie is only accidentally related to the things that it ties up. But definitions are standard examples of real unities. For definitions are only or chiefly definitions of substances, and substances are real unities.​[45]​ 
Possibly, what Aristotle has in mind in H 3 is the following idea. Normally, we obtain the definition of a substance by putting together a certain number of predicates: we get the definition of a human being, for instance, by putting together ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’. This procedure, however, may easily mislead us into thinking that the nature of a definition is merely aggregative or summative. But this is not the case. For two or more predicates make up a definition only if they are the right predicates, that is, those expressing the nature of the object defined. If we put together, for instance, ‘black’, ‘tall’, and ‘animal’ we shall certainly obtain a complex property (being a black tall animal), but not a nature or an essence. Another way of pressing this line of thought is to say that there is something in virtue of which ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’ hang together, something that makes them the right predicates for the definition of a human being. That something cannot but be the nature of human beings which both ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’ contribute to define. Thus, on this line of thought, what guarantees the unity of a definition is not one of its parts, but the nature of the object that the parts jointly contribute to define.
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